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I. INTRODUCTION
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution ensures
that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself."' In 1966, the United States Supreme Court handed
down its famous decision in Miranda v. Arizona,2 which held that
before custodial interrogation, suspects must be informed that (1) they
have the right to remain silent, (2) anything they say can be used
against them in a court of law, (3) they are entitled to have a lawyer
present during the interrogation, and (4) they are entitled to have a
court appointed lawyer present during the interrogation if they cannot
afford one.3 After the police have administered the warnings, they
must obtain a valid waiver from suspects before beginning the
interrogation.4 The Miranda Court believed that these protections
would preserve the suspect's right against self-incrimination, guaran-
teed by the Fifth Amendment.'
Prior to the enactment of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms in 1982,6 the Supreme Court of Canada eschewed any
relationship between self-incrimination and admissions made to the
police by suspects before trial. 7 The privilege against self-incrimina-
1. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
2. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
3. Id. at 444. In Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195 (1989), the Supreme Court of the
United States held that the Miranda warnings need not be given in the exact form described in
the opinion. "The inquiry," wrote Chief Justice Rehnquist, "is simply whether the warnings
reasonably conve[y] to [a suspect] his right as required by Miranda." Id. at 203. The Miranda
warnings are not sufficient if the reference to a court appointed attorney is linked to a future time
after the police finish the interrogation. California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355, 360 (1981).
4. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. The Court has held that the Miranda warnings are mere
prophylactic rules designed to protect the privilege against self-incrimination. Nevertheless, the
failure of the police to adhere to the Miranda rules raises a presumption of compulsion, and the
subsequent confession is inadmissible during the prosecutor's case-in-chief. Oregon v. Elstad, 470
U.S. 298, 307 (1985).
5. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476.
6. CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms).
7. Marcoux & Soloman v. The Queen, [1976] 1 S.C.R. 763, 768. Prior to the Charter,
Professor Ratushny argued that self-incrimination had nothing to do with admissions made by
accused persons outside of formal proceedings. ED RATUSHNY, SELF-INCRIMINATION IN
CANADIAN CRIMINAL PROCESS 59-66 (1979). Professor Paciocco, of the University of Ottawa,
argues persuasively that Ratushny's thesis was consistent with what was being said, but not with
what was being done. Paciocco suggests, for example, that the Court's concerns about self-
incrimination explain why involuntary statements were excluded only when made to persons in
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tion, the Court held, meant only two things: (1) the witness was
protected while testifying, and (2) the defendant did not need to testify
at all.8  Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of Canada historically
excluded confessions that were obtained involuntarily by the police.'
Statements were involuntary if they were obtained from suspects as a
result of "fear of prejudice" or "hope of advantage" held out by a"person in authority" and were made without an operating mind.1 °
Under this common law confession rule, police officers were not
required to advise suspects of their right to remain silent, but failure
to administer such a caution was a factor examined in determining
whether the confession was obtained voluntarily."
In April 1982, the government of Canada patriated the Canadian
Constitution, which includes a constitutionally entrenched Charter of
Rights and Freedoms. 12 The Charter owes some of its substance to
the Bill of Rights in the United States Constitution. 3 Like the Bill
of Rights, the Charter protects the rights of the accused from
government action.14 However, unlike the Bill of Rights, the Charter
authority. David M. Paciocco, Self-Incrimination: Removing the Coffin Nails, 35 MCGILL L.J.
73, 82-83 (1989) [hereinafter Paciocco, Coffin Nails].
8. Marcoux & Soloman, [1976 1 S.C.R. at 768.
9. It was never clear whether the Canadian Court excluded confessions because they were
involuntary or because the involuntary nature of the confession made its admission untrustworthy.
The Court, for example, was reluctant to exclude from trial confessions or portions of confessions
that appeared trustworthy but were obtained involuntarily. As a result, if the Crown
demonstrated by independent evidence that portions of an involuntary confession were
trustworthy, those portions were admissible at trial against the defendant. See, e.g., Regina v.
Wray, (19711 S.C.R. 272.
10. Ibrahim v. The King, [1914] A.C. 599, 602; see also Ward v. The Queen [1979] 2
S.C.R. 30, 39-40; Horvath v. The Queen, [1979] 2 S.C.R. 376, 389; Rosalind Conway, No Man's
Land: Confessions Not Induced by Fear of Prejudice or Hope of Advantage, 42 U. TORONTO FAC.
L. REV. 27 (1984).
11. GERALD A. BEAUDOIN & ED RATUSHNY, THE CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS
AND FREEDOMS 456 (2d ed. 1989).
12. CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms). For a history of the patriation of the Constitution, see EDWARD MCWHINNEY,
CANADA AND THE CONSTITUTION 1979-1982: PATRIATION AND THE CHARTER OF RIGHTS
AND FREEDOMS (1982).
13. Perhaps more importantly, the Charter is modeled after the European Convention on
Human Rights and the International Convenant of Civil and Political Rights. Peter W. Hogg,
Canada's New Charter of Rights, 32 AM. J. COMP. L. 283, 284 (1984).
14. Retail, Wholesale and Dep't Store Union Local 580 v. Dolphin Delivery, [19861 2
S.C.R. 573. Although some Canadian commentators argued that the Charter applied to private
actions, the courts have been reluctant to agree. Dale Gibson, The Charter of Rights and the
Private Sector, 12 MAN. L.J. 213 (1982).
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explicitly states that it applies to provincial as well as federal govern-
ments. 15
The provisions of the Charter relating to confessions and their
exclusion from trial are relatively straight-forward. Section 10(b) of the
Charter requires the police to inform a detained or arrested person of
his right to retain and instruct counsel without delay. 6 Section 7
ensures that everyone has the right to life, liberty, security of the
person, and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance
with the principles of fundamental justice.' 7 Section 24(2) requires
trial judges to exclude from trial evidence obtained by the police in a
manner that violated a Charter right" if it is more probable than not
15. Section 32 of the Charter provides:
This Charter applies
(a) to the Parliament and government of Canada in respect of all matters within the
authority of Parliament including all matters relating to the Yukon Territory and
Northwest Territories; and
(b) to the legislature and government of each province in respect of all matters
within the authority of the legislature of each province.
CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms), § 32(1).
In contrast to the Canadian Charter, a particular right in the Bill of Rights is not applicable to
state authorities unless explicitly found within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.
16. CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms), § 10(b).
17. Id. pt. I, § 7. American readers familiar with the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment will notice two textual omissions. First, property is not protected by section 7.
Second, the phrase "due process of law" does not appear. These omissions were intentional.
During the debate over the Charter, the Maritime provinces, fearful of non-resident ownership
of land, and the New Democratic Party, concerned that inclusion of property might prohibit the
government of Canada and the provinces from nationalizing corporations, objected to enshrining
property rights within the Charter. To gain the support of these groups, the federal government
removed the term "property." The phrase "due process of law" was omitted because of concerns
that the Supreme Court of Canada might interpret the expression to include a United States style
substantive due process, opening up the possibility that social programs in Canada would be
declared in violation of the Charter. Framers of the Charter believed that inclusion of the
language "principles of fundamental justice" would limit interpretation of the section to procedural
matters. However, in Reference re § 94(2) of Motor Vehicle Act, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486, the
Supreme Court of Canada held that section 7 can be used to examine the substance of legislation.
The intentions of the framers are admissible to interpret Charter sections, but the weight given
this evidence in Reference re § 94(2) of Motor Vehicle Act was slight. Id. at 488.
18. The phrase "obtained in a manner," according to some scholars, required the accused
to show a causal connection between the Charter breach and the discovery of the evidence. The
Supreme Court of Canada, in Regina v. Strachan, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 980, rejected this position and
held that only a temporal relationship is needed between the Charter breach and the discovery of
the evidence. Id. at 1005. Chief Justice Brian Dickson was careful to note that the presence of
a temporal connection is not always determinative. Id. Situations will arise, he suggested, where
evidence following the breach of a Charter right will be too remote from the violation to be"obtained in a manner" that infringes the Charter. Id. An example of such a lack of temporal
relationship is found in Regina v. Upston, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 1083. In Upston, the suspect was
detained in his home without being informed of his right to retain and instruct counsel as required
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that admission of the evidence would bring the administration of
justice into disrepute.19 The Supreme Court of Canada has said that
exclusion is mandatory once these conditions have been met, and that
they will not review the judgment of the lower courts regarding
application of section 24(2) to the facts of each case.2" There is room,
however, for judicial discretion at the trial level to exclude or admit
evidence, and the Supreme Court will review the trial judge's decision
when there is an apparent error in the application of the principles or
when the judge's findings are unreasonable.21
The Court has found that the policy underlying sections 10(b) and
7 is to ensure, in part, that the accused is treated fairly during the
investigatory process and given a choice whether to talk to the
police.22  Although section 11(c) of the Charter retains Canada's
doctrine that the privilege against self-incrimination applies only at
trial, 23 interpretation of sections 10(b) and 7 by the Supreme Court
of Canada suggests that the purpose of the rights to silence and to
retain and instruct counsel without delay before trial is to protect the
by section 10(b) of the Charter. Id. at 1083. After the arrest, officers read the section 10(b)
warning and obtained incriminating statements. Id. The Supreme Court, in a short opinion,
found no temporal relationship between the Charter breach and the second confession. Id. at
1083-84. For more on the link between the Charter breach and the discovery of self-
incriminating evidence, see infra note 55.
19. Section 24(2) of the Charter states:
Where, in proceedings under subsection (1), a court concludes that evidence was
obtained in a manner that infringed or denied any rights or freedoms guaranteed by this
Charter, the evidence shall be excluded if it is established that, having regard to all the
circumstances, the admission of it in the proceedings would bring the administration of
justice into disrepute.
CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms), § 24(2).
20. Regina v. Kokesch, [19901 3 S.C.R. 3, 20.
21. Regina v. Wise, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 527, 540. The Court has not been clear in what it
meant by mandatory exclusion on the one hand and judicial discretion to admit or exclude
evidence from trial on the other. Nevertheless, it has not hesitated to overrule decisions of trial
judges to exclude or admit evidence. What is clear is that, in applying section 24(2), judges have
placed -hemselves in the unique position of defining what conduct of theirs will bring the
administration of justice into disrepute. David M. Paciocco, The Judicial Repeal of S. 24(2) and
the Development of the Canadian Exclusionary Rule, 32 CRIM. L.Q. 326, 333 (1990) [hereinafter
Paciocco, Judicial Repeal].
22. Regina v. Whitte, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 9, 45, 914, 939.
23. Section 11(c) states:
Any person charged with an offence has the right not to be compelled to be a witness
in proceedings against that person in respect of the offence.
CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms), § 11(c).
Section 13 of the Charter also speaks to the right against self-incrimination:
A witness who testifies in any proceedings has the right not to have any incriminating
evidence so given used to incriminate that witness in any other proceedings, except in
a prosecution for perjury or for the giving of contradictory evidence.
CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms), § 13.
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privilege.2 4 Thus, sections 10(b) and 7 protect the fairness of the trial
by ensuring that the accused is not subjected to compelled incrimina-
tion.21
Moreover, the Court has also found a fair trial policy underlying
the exclusionary rule.26  The admission of confessions obtained in
violation of the Charter, according to the Court, would undermine
one of the fundamental tenets of a fair trial, the right against self
incrimination. '2 7 The close affinity between the purposes underlying
sections 10(b), 7, and 24(2) has led the Canadian Court to go beyond
the Supreme Court of the United States in excluding confessions at
trial.
This Article explores the Supreme Court of Canada's use of the
Charter of Rights and Freedoms in limiting police interrogations and
compares its case decisions with cases from the Supreme Court of the
United States. Part II of this Article examines the purposes and
policies underlying sections 10(b), 7, and 24(2) of the Charter. Part III
then examines the application of sections 10(b) and 7 in situations
where (1) suspects are interrogated by uniformed police officers or
other persons known to be in authority, and (2) suspects are interrogat-
ed surreptitiously by persons not known to be in authority. In both
situations, the Supreme Court of Canada has been more solicitous of
the rights of the accused than has the Supreme Court of the United
States.
II. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS UNDERLYING SECTIONS
10(b), 7, AND 24(2)
The Supreme Court of Canada has given the Charter a purposive
interpretation. The Charter, the Court stressed, must be capable of
growth and development to meet new social, economic, and political
changes that its framers did not foresee.2' The definition of a right
should be, according to former Chief Justice Brian Dickson, "a
generous rather than a legalistic one, aimed at fulfilling the purpose of
the guarantee and securing for individuals the full benefit of the
Charter's protection. 129 The interpretation of a Charter right, the
Court emphasized, must not exceed the actual purpose of the right but
24. Regina v. Black, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 138, 152-53.
25. Id.
26. Regina v. Collins, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265, 278.
27. Id. at 284.
28. Hunter v. Southam, [19841 2 S.C.R. 145, 167-68.
29. Regina v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, 344.
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must conform to its proper linguistic, philosophic, and historical
context.3 °
The Court has examined the interests and policies underlying the
Charter sections concerning self-incrimination. The values identified
as protected by that Charter section play a dominant role in the
Court's willingness to exclude evidence from trial, as will be discussed
throughout this Article.
A. Section I 0(b)
Section 10(b) guarantees the right of the accused, upon arrest or
detention, to "retain and instruct counsel without delay and to be
informed of that right. ' 3  The right to retain and instruct counsel in
Canada protects the dignity of defendants, ensures that statements
made by defendants are properly transcribed, expedites the preparation
of the defense, reduces the possibility of coercion by the police,32 and
30. Id. Part of the reason for the purposive approach to Charter jurisprudence was the
cautious approach taken by the Supreme Court of Canada in its interpretation of the Canadian
Bill of Rights. Enacted by Parliament in 1960, the Bill of Rights was not a constitutional
document but an ordinary statute applicable to matters only within federal jurisdiction. The
legislation is not applicable to matters within provincial authority. Although in theory the Court
could use the Bill of Rights to strike down laws of Parliament (as opposed to laws of provincial
legislatures) that were in contravention of the Bill of Rights, it did so only in one case. See
Regina v. Drybones, [1969] 3 S.C.R. 282. Moreover, the preamble to the Bill caused the Court
concern. The preamble reads: "It is hereby recognized and declared that in Canada there have
existed and shall continue to exist .. " Canadian Bill of Rights, S.C. 1960, preamble. Some
justices expressed concern that the language applied only to legislation enacted prior to the Bill.
To the extent that this interpretation was followed, it meant that the Bill of Rights was frozen in
time and could not grow and develop to meet changes in society. Regina v. Burnshine, [1974]
44 D.L.R.3d 584, 586; Regina v. Miller & Cockriell, [1976] 70 D.L.R.3d 324, 324; see also
WALTER TARNOPOLSKY, THE CANADIAN BILL OF RIGHTS 128 (1975). The Bill of Rights is
still in effect. Canadian Bill of Rights, S.C. 1960.
31. CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms), § 10(b).
32. MARIE FINKELSTEIN, THE RIGHT To COUNSEL 1-1 to 1-6 (1988). These first four
purposes are similar to those protected by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the United States
Constitution. The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination protects a central feature
of the adversary system-that the defendant may not be compelled to contribute to his or her
conviction, for example. Moreover, the privilege prevents cruelty, ensures that defendants are
treated with dignity, and promotes the search for truth by confirming that confessions are
trustworthy. MARK BERGER, TAKING THE FIFTH: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF INCRIMINATION 25-44 (1988); see also George E. Dix, Federal
Constitutional Confession Law: The 1986 and 1987 Supreme Court Terms, 67 TEX. L. REV. 231,
245 (1988); LEONARD LEVY, THE ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT: THE RIGHT
AGAINST SELF INCRIMINATION 345-55,430-31 (1968). In Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, the
right to counsel promotes a fair trial, preserves the adversary system, and gives legal assistance
to the defendant when confronted with the power of the state. See Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S.
159, 169 (1985); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 409 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring); United
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 220 (1967); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964);
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promotes fair treatment of defendants in situations that may give rise
to a "significant legal consequence."33 Perhaps more importantly, the
right to counsel protects the due administration of the adversary system
by giving detainees the option of seeking the assistance of counsel to
protect their legal interests. Without such an option, the right against
self-incrimination might be compromised and suspects placed in a
position of having to take the witness stand to counter the damaging
effects of statements they may have made. Madame Justice Bertha
Wilson summarized the Supreme Court of Canada's philosophy
regarding the right to counsel when she opined that "[t]he fairness of
the trial would be adversely affected since the admission of the
statement would infringe on the appellant's right against self-incrimina-
tion, a right which could have been protected had the appellant had an
opportunity to consult counsel."34
B. Section 7
Section 7 provides that everyone has the right to life, liberty, and
security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except
in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.35 The rights
protected by section 7 are broader than those safeguarded by the
enumerated rights in the Charter. Life, liberty, and security of the
person are given individual meaning, and the "principles of fundamen-
tal justice" are not to be seen as separate rights but as qualifiers of the
right to life, liberty, and security of the person.36 They are found,
according to the Court, "in the basic tenets and principles of our legal
system. '3 7  Recently, the Supreme Court examined the basic tenets
of the Canadian legal system and found a right to silence in section 7
that attached upon detention.38
see also James J. Tomkovicz, An Adversary System Defense of the Right to Counsel Against
Informants: Truth, Fair Play, and the Massiah Doctrine, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 52 (1988).
33. Regina v. Therens, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 613, 616; see also Peter B. Michalyshyn, Charter
Right to Counsel: Beyond Miranda, 25 ALTA. L. REV. 190, 194-99 (1986).
34. Regina v. Black, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 138, 160.
35. CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms), § 7.
36. Singh v. Minister of Employment and Immigration, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177, 201-02.
37. Reference re § 94(2) of Motor Vehicle Act, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486, 503. This case is an
example of the Supreme Court of Canada's reference jurisdiction. The Province of British
Columbia asked the Court to determine the constitutionality of a statute that prohibited driving
with an expired license but did not require proof of mens rea and included jail as punishment.
The Court held that the statute breached section 7 of the Charter. Id.
38. Regina v. Hebert, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 151, 175. The Court did not require the police to
warn suspects of their right to silence. Id. The majority assumed that lawyers would advise their
clients of this right. Id.; see infra part III. In the United States, the right to silence has been
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The essence of the pre-trial right to silence, according to the
Court, is freedom of choice.39 If the conduct of the police effectively
and unfairly deprives a detainee of his or her right to refuse to speak
to the authorities, section 7 is violated.40 The purpose of section 7,
the Court emphasized, is to seek a balance between the interests of the
detained individual and those of the state.4' On one hand, section 7
provides persons with protection against the unfair use of the superior
resources of the state.42 On the other hand, it permits the state to
deprive a person of life, liberty, and security so long as the state
respects the fundamental principles of justice.43 Applying these
concepts to the right to silence, the Court has concluded that section
7 protects a detainee's right to choose whether or not he will make a
statement to the police.44 If a suspect chooses not to make a state-
ment, the state cannot use its superior power to override his will and
compel him to contribute to his own conviction."
C. Section 24(2)
The purpose of Canada's exclusionary rule is to protect the
reputation of the justice system. The deterrent theory adopted by the
United States Supreme Court to justify the exclusionary rule has been
explicitly rejected by the Supreme Court of Canada.46 "The main
reason for this," according to Madame Justice Claire L'Heureux Dube,
"is that the price of exclusion is not paid by the'police, and that
consequently, from the police's point of view, exclusion generally
would amount to no punishment at all."47 Certainly, police miscon-
associated with the privilege against self-incrimination.
39. Hebert, [1990] 2 S.C.R. at 181.
40. Id. at 181-82.
41. Id. at 182-83.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 181.
45. Id.
46. Deterring unconstitutional police behavior is the purpose of the Fourth Amendment's
exclusionary rule. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974). In Michigan v. Tucker,
417 U.S. 433 (1974), the Court hinted that there may be a deterrent rationale for the Fifth
Amendment's exclusionary rule. Id. at 442. In Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985), another
Fifth Amendment case, Justice O'Connor mentioned the twin rationales of trustworthiness and
deterrence. Id. at 300.
47. Regina v. Duguay, Murphy & Sevigny, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 93, 123 (L'Heureux Dube, J.,
dissenting on other grounds). At most, the Supreme Court of Canada hopes that its decisions will
foster a positive attitude on the part of the police toward Charter rights. Nevertheless, the
deterrent theory seems to play a role in the Court's decision to exclude evidence. In excluding
the evidence in Duguay, Murphy & Sevigny, the Ontario Court of Appeal used "blind eye"
reasoning, namely, if courts turn a blind eye to police misconduct, the police may assume that
1996]
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duct may bring the administration of justice into disrepute, but the
purpose of section 24(2) is "to prevent having the administration of
justice brought into further disrepute by the admission of the evidence
in the proceeding. '' 48 According to Chief Justice Lamer, the relevant
question for judges is "whether the evidence could bring the adminis-
tration of justice into disrepute in the eyes of the reasonable man,
dispassionate and fully apprised of the circumstances of the case."49
The answer to the question is not determined by taking opinion polls
or conferring with the public. The Charter was designed to protect the
defendant from the majority, and its enforcement, Chief Justice Lamer
argued, cannot be left to the majority."0 The enforcement is in the
hands of judges who, taking into consideration all the factors, can best
determine whether, in the eyes of a reasonable dispassionate person, the
admission of the evidence would bring the system of justice into
disrepute."' The focus of the rule, therefore, is aimed at protecting
the reputation of the judicial system by safeguarding the fairness of the
trial.
There are two requirements for exclusion of evidence under
section 24(2).12 First, there must be a Charter violation in the course
of obtaining evidence. 3 Under this threshold requirement, evidence
must be presented to establish a connection between the infringement
of the Charter right and the obtaining of evidence which is sought to
be excluded. 4 This link is not a strict one, however. So long as the
evidence sought to be excluded is remotely connected with the Charter
breach, it falls within the scope of section 24(2).'5
they have the courts' tacit approval to continue the activity. Regina v. Duguay, Murphy &
Sevigny, [1988] 18 D.L.R.4th 32. The majority of the Supreme Court of Canada seemed to agree
with this reasoning when it stated: "The Court of Appeal did not enunciate any principle with
which we disagree." Duguay, Murphy & Sevigny, [1989] 1 S.C.R. at 98. Although Canadian
courts have eschewed the deterrent rationale for the exclusionary rule, their use of blind eye
reasoning is aimed at deterring police misconduct. Id.
48. Regina v. Collins, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265, 281-82 (emphasis added).
49. Collins, [1987] 1 S.C.R. at 282. This test was first recommended by Professor
Morissette. Yves-Marie Morissette, The Exclusion Under the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms: What to Do and What Not to Do, 29 MCGILL L.J. 521, 538 (1984).
50. Collins, [1987] 1 S.C.R. at 281-82.
51. Id.
52. Regina v. Strachan, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 980, 999.
53. Id. at 1000.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1006-07. The accused bears the ultimate burden of persuasion under section
24(2). Nevertheless, the onus on any particular issue will shift back and forth between the Crown
and the accused. One issue that arises in section 10(b) cases is whether the accused would have
acted any differently had there been no violation of his or her right to counsel. This issue goes
to the strength of the link between the Charter breach and the evidence obtained. In Regina v.
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Second, the accused must establish that admission of the evidence
at trial would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.16 In
Regina v. Collins,7 the seminal case interpreting section 24(2), the
Supreme Court of Canada established three sets of factors to determine
whether the admission of the evidence would bring the administration
of justice into disrepute.58 The first set of factors concerns the
Pozniak, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 310 and Regina v. Harper, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 343, the Court stated that
the onus was on the Crown to demonstrate that the accused would not have acted differently had
he or she been informed properly of his or her right to counsel. In Pozniak, the suspect was
arrested for impaired driving at 4:00 a.m. He was partially informed of his section 10(b) rights.
Pozniak, [1994] 3 S.C.R. at 311. (For what constitutes being fully informed under section 10(b),
see infra section III.A.4.). At the police station he told officers that he wanted to talk with his
lawyer. He picked up the telephone but did not dial the number. Pozniak, [1994] 3 S.C.R. at
311. Moreover, he told the breathalyzer technician that he was confused as to whether he should
call a lawyer and that his lawyer was probably on holiday. Id. Pozniak testified that he would
probably have talked with a lawyer had he been fully informed of his section 10(b) rights. Id.
Under these circumstances, the Court held that the Crown had not met its burden of
demonstrating that, on the balance of probabilities, Pozniak would not have acted differently. Id.
at 315. In Harper, however, the accused, upon being approached by the police, made a
spontaneous incriminating statement while still at the scene of the incident. [1994] 3 S.C.R. at
343. After having been partially advised of his section 10(b) rights, the accused made another
incriminating statement. Id. The Court held that the Crown had met its burden of demonstrat-
ing that the accused would not have acted differently if he had been properly warned. Id. at 353.
The Court found that the accused had an "almost irresistible desire to confess." Id. at 354. The
accused neither testified nor provided any evidence that he would have demanded counsel had he
been fully aware of his rights. Id.
56. Strachan, [1988] 2 S.C.R. at 1007; see also Dale Gibson, Shocking the Public: Early
Indications of the Meaning of 'Disrepute' in Section 24(2) of the Charter, 13 MAN. L. REV. 495,
498-501 (1983).
57. [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265.
58. Id. at 267. Some scholars argue that section 24(2) was intended to be used sparingly
and only in narrow circumstances. Paciocco, Judicial Repeal, supra note 21, at 333. Early
supporters of the Charter's exclusionary rule argued that a "community shock" test was the
appropriate standard. Many lower courts initially accepted the community shock test as
controlling. M. Proulx, Redefining the Balance of Criminal Trial: The Effect of the Exclusionary
Rule in Section 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Lecture at Cambridge
University (1985) (transcript available in the University of Victoria Law Library). Testimony
before Parliament suggests that framers of the Charter believed that section 24(2) would be
applied only in the most repugnant cases of police abuse. MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND
EVIDENCE OF THE SPECIAL JOINT COMMITTEE OF THE SENATE AND OF THE HOUSE OF
COMMONS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF CANADA, 1980, vol. 6 48:124 (available in the
University of Victoria Undergraduate Library). Justice Lamer, the author of the Collins opinion,
gave two reasons for rejecting the community shock test. First, breaches of the Charter are
violations of the most important law in the land. Collins, [1987) 1 S.C.R. at 266. Second, Canada
is officially bilingual and the French version of section 24(2) is less onerous than the English text.
Id. The English text uses the language "would" bring the administration of justice into disrepute,
while the French reading, "est susceptible de deconsiderer I'administration de la justice,"
translates as "could" bring the administration of justice into disrepute. For a brief history of the
Canadian exlusionary rule, see Robert A. Harvie, The Exclusionary Rule and the Good Faith
Doctrine in the United States and Canada: A Comparison, 14 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 779,
791 (1992).
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fairness of the trial, 9 the second centers on the seriousness of the
Charter violation,60 and the third is directed toward the effect of
exclusion on the repute of the administration of justice.6
1. Fairness of the Trial
According to Justice Lamer in Collins, if the evidence tends to
affect the fairness of the trial, it should be excluded.62 Real or
physical evidence obtained in a manner that violated the Charter would
rarely render the trial unfair because such evidence exists irrespective
of the Charter violation. In contrast, confessions and other evidence
emanating from the accused that was obtained in violation of the
Charter, particularly the right to counsel, will render the trial unfair
because it strikes at a fundamental tenet of the fair trial, the right
against self-incrimination.
Although some justices have expressed reservations about the
wisdom of the distinction between evidence that affects the fairness of
the trial and that which does not, the distinction has nevertheless taken
root. The Court, however, reserves the former characterization for
statements and other evidence that does not exist independently of the
accused.63
Justice La Forest argues that the distinction should not be
between confessions and real evidence, but between evidence that the
defendant was forced to create and evidence that the defendant was
forced to locate or identify.64 According to Justice La Forest, if the
defendant is forced to create evidence as a result of a Charter breach,
he or she effectively provides the Crown with evidence it would not
otherwise have had.6" This is the kind of prejudice that the right
against self-incrimination, as well as the right to counsel, is designed
to prevent. If the effect of the breach, however, is to force the
defendant to locate or identify the evidence, the use of the evidence
59. Collins, [1987] 1 S.C.R. at 267.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 269. This distinction, at least as it is explained in Collins and exemplified in
subsequent decisions, hardly seems self-evident. Why does a statement obtained in violation of
the right to counsel affect the fairness of the trial, but not an item of real evidence seized in
violation of the right to be secure from unreasonable searches? In both cases, the police would
not have secured the evidence-at least not under the circumstances existing at that time-if they
had obeyed the law. See R. J. Delisle, Collins, An Unjustified Distinction, [1987] 56 CRIM. REP.
(3d) 216.
64. Collins, [1987] 1 S.C.R. at 269.
65. Id.
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does not affect the fairness of the trial because it would have been
discovered anyway.66
2. Seriousness of the Charter Violation
The seriousness of the Charter violation centers on the conduct of
the authorities. On one hand, if the police's violation of the Charter
was deliberate, willful, or flagrant, the trial judge would exclude
evidence obtained as a result of the violation from trial.67 On the
other hand, if the police acted in good faith, or the Charter violation
was trivial or technical in nature, the judge would likely admit the
evidence.6"
3. Long-Term Effect of Exclusion on the
Administration of Justice
In this category, the seriousness of the Charter breach is weighed
against the gravity of the crime charged. According to Justice Lamer,
evidence will likely be admitted when the Charter violation is trivial
and the offense is serious. Evidence is more likely to be excluded if
the offense is less serious. However, if admitting the evidence is likely
to affect the fairness of the trial, the seriousness of the offense will not
be considered so as to render the evidence admissible.69
66. Thomson Newspapers Ltd. v. Canada (Dir. of Investigation and Research, Restrictive
Trade Practices Comm'n), [1990] 1 S.C.R. 425, 488; see also Regina v. Wise, [1992] 1 S.C.R.
527, 529; Regina v. Mellenthin, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 615, 627-28 (stressing the difference between
independently existing real evidence that could have been found without the compelled testimony
and independently existing real evidence that would have been found without compelled
testimony); Charles B. Davidson, Connecting Real Evidence and Trial Fairness: The Doctrine of
"Discoverability," 35 CRIM. L.Q. 493, 505-06 (1993). In Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984),
the United States Supreme Court developed the inevitable discovery exception to the Fourth
Amendment's exclusionary rule. Id. at 448.
67. The Supreme Court of Canada has defined the term "flagrant" rather broadly. In
Regina v. Therens, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 613, for example, the Court labeled "flagrant" the failure of
a police officer to inform a suspect of his right to retain and instruct counsel even though the facts
occurred shortly after the enactment of the Charter and the officer followed proper pre-Charter
procedures ascribed by the Supreme Court of Canada. Id. at 620. In Regina v. Greffe, [1990
1 S.C.R. 755, a case involving the seizure of real evidence, the Supreme Court of Canada found
the officer's behavior a flagrant violation of the Charter even though the facts occurred before its
enactment. Id. at 759. In Regina v. Kokesch, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 3, the Supreme Court of Canada
admitted the possibility that good faith reliance on previous case precedent may be sufficient to
admit evidence that does not affect the fairness of the trial. Id. at 19-20. See Harvie, supra note
58, at 791.
68. Collins, [1987] 1 S.C.R. at 285-86; see also Therens, [1985] 1 S.C.R. at 132-33.
69. Collins, [1987] 1 S.C.R. at 283-86. The third set of factors seems doomed to
irrelevance. Once it is decided that evidence tends to affect the fairness of the trial, even the
seriousness of the offense does not count against exclusion. If the evidence does not affect the
fairness of the trial but the violation of the Charter is serious, this also means that the evidence
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4. Affinity Between Right to Counsel and the
Exclusionary Rule
A close affinity has developed in the jurisprudence between
sections 10(b) and 24(2). Section 10(b), according to Madam Justice
Wilson, "is clearly unconcerned with the probative value of any
evidence obtained by the police but rather . . . [is concerned with the]
fair treatment of an accused person. ' 7' The exclusionary rule found
in section 24(2) maintains the reputation of the system by ensuring a
fair trial. Confessions and evidence emanating from the accused,71
obtained in violation of section 10(b), render the trial unfair since that
evidence did not exist prior to the violation of the Charter and, more
importantly, its admission at trial would strike at "one of the funda-
mental tenets of a fair trial, the right against self-incrimination. 72
Under this theory, it is axiomatic that if police fail to observe the
section 10(b) requirements and conscript the defendant against himself
or herself, the resulting confession or evidence emanating from the
accused is automatically excluded from trial. Neither the good faith
conduct of the police nor the seriousness of the offense can effectively
weigh against the unfairness of admitting the confession.
The close relationship between sections 10(b) and 24(2) is further
demonstrated by the Court's willingness to admit confessions where
the statements were obtained in violation of a Charter section other
should be excluded. One reaches the third set of factors only if one has already concluded that
the evidence does not affect the fairness of the trial and the breach is not serious. If these
conclusions are reached, the evidence can be admitted without further analysis.
70. Regina v. Clarkson, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 383, 394.
71. The concept of evidence emanating from the accused goes beyond the traditional notion
of testimonial self-incrimination and includes line-up identification and the results of blood tests.
See Regina v. Ross, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 3 (line-up identification); Regina v. Dyment, [1988] 2 S.C.R.
417 (blood samples). For a discussion of evidence emanating from the accused, see infra section
III.A.3. All a lawyer can do is advise his clients that refusal to participate will lead to adverse
inference at trial. In the United States, line-up identification is not self-incrimination within the
meaning of the Fifth Amendment and counsel, therefore, is not required at a line-up conducted
prior to indictment. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688 (1972). After indictment, the Sixth
Amendment requires counsel at line-ups. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 219 (1967).
Moreover, blood samples are not testimonial in nature and may be seized within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 758 (1966); accord Winston v.
Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 763 (1985). For a detailed comparison of these points, see Robert Harvie &
Hamar Foster, Ties That Bind? The Supreme Court of Canada, American Jurisprudence, and the
Revision of Canadian Criminal Law Under the Charter, 28 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 729 (1990)
[hereinafter Harvie & Foster, Ties That Bind]. According to David Paciocco, the exclusion from
trial of evidence emanating from the accused is not based on the concept of self-incrimination, but
rather on the common law principle of an absence of a pre-trial obligation. Paciocco, Coffin Nails,
supra note 7, at 78.
72. Collins, [1987] 1 S.C.R. at 284.
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than section 10(b). The Court, for example, has permitted the use of
statements at trial obtained in violation of section 8 of the Charter.73
Section 8 protects citizens in Canada by prohibiting unreasonable
searches and seizures. The section's purpose is to protect a reasonable
expectation of privacy.74 The Supreme Court of Canada has held that
warrants are necessary before the police can surreptitiously tape record
face-to-face conversations with suspects who are neither detained nor
in custody.7 Failure to obtain a warrant, however, does not automat-
ically result in the exclusion of a confession, in part, because the
underlying policy governing section 8 concerns privacy of the
individual and has little to do with a fair trial.76
The policies underlying the right to silence in section 7 are similar
to the policies underlying the right to counsel. A violation of the
defendant's right to silence, like a violation of the right to counsel,
adversely affects the privilege against self-incrimination and renders the
trial unfair because "[t]he accused would be ... placed in the position
of having to take the stand if he wished to counter the damaging effect
of the confession. "'77  Nevertheless, in right to silence cases, the
majority of the Court has not ruled out "the possibility that there may
be circumstances in which a statement might be received where the
suspect has not been accorded a full choice in the sense of having
decided, after full observance of all rights, to make a statement
voluntarily. '78  To date, however, the Supreme Court of Canada has
excluded from trial all confessions obtained in violation of either the
defendant's right to counsel or his right to silence.79
73. Regina v. Duarte, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 30; Regina v. Wiggins, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 62. Both
of these cases were decided under section 8 of the Charter. See infra section III.B.2 for analysis
of these decisions. The confession will be excluded if the police acted in bad faith. Harvie, supra
note 58, at 793.
74. Hunter v. Southam, Inc., [19841 2 S.C.R. 145, 156-57.
75. Id. at 157.
76. Id.
77. Regina v. Hebert, (1990] 2 S.C.R. 151, 189.
78. Id. at 188.
79. Paciocco, Judicial Repeal, supra note 21, at 358.
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III. APPLICATION OF SECTIONS 10(b) AND 7
A. Questioning of Suspects by Uniformed Officers or a Person
Known to be in Authority
Section 10(b) has been interpreted to require uniformed officers,
or other persons known by detainees to be in authority, to inform
detainees of their right to instruct and retain counsel without delay.s
In addition, officers are required to provide a reasonable opportunity
for suspects to obtain counsel and to make no attempt to elicit evidence
from suspects until they have an opportunity to consult counsel. 81
For their part, detainees must make a reasonable effort to contact an
attorney82 and can waive their right to retain and instruct counsel.83
In Canada, the warnings in section 10(b) offer more protection
than Miranda in a number of ways: (1) the warnings must be
administered upon detention,84 (2) a more stringent waiver require-
ment is imposed,8" (3) non-testimonial as well as testimonial evidence
from the accused is excluded,86 (4) the right to government appointed
counsel is enhanced, 7 and (5) counsel is provided before a search.8
However, the requirements of section 10(b) offer less protection
than the Miranda warnings because police officers in Canada are not
required to warn detainees of their right to silence.89
1. Detention
The Supreme Court of Canada has defined "detention," as it is
used in section 10(b), broadly. Detention, according to the Court,
occurs when there is a restraint of liberty, other than an arrest, in
which a person may reasonably require the assistance of counsel but
might be prevented or impeded from retaining and instructing
counsel."0 In addition to physical restraint, detention occurs when
80. Regina v. Therens, [19851 1 S.C.R. 613, 620.
81. Regina v. Manninen, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1233, 1234.
82. Regina v. Smith, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 368, 370 (refusing to find a section 10(b) violation
when the detainee failed to make a reasonable effort to contact counsel).
83. Regina v. Clarkson, (1986] 1 S.C.R. 383, 385.
84. See infra notes 90-93 and accompanying text.
85. See infra notes 141-145 and accompanying text.
86. See infra notes 146-148 and accompanying text.
87. See infra notes 216-219 and accompanying text.
88. See infra notes 227-230 and accompanying text.
89. Hebert, [1990] 2 S.C.R. at 184. Nevertheless, police officers in Canada regularly warn
suspects of their right to silence. The standard caution incorporates this right.
90. Therens, [1985] 1 S.C.R. at 641.
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police officers assume control over the movement of a person by a
demand or direction that may have significant legal consequences.91
Compulsion or coercion arises in these cases, according to the Court,
from criminal liability resulting from a refusal to comply with a
demand or direction of a police officer, or from the reasonable belief
that one does not have a choice as to whether or not to comply.9 2
This broad definition of detention means that suspects in Canada must
be informed of their right to retain and instruct counsel without delay
well in advance of their American counterparts, who need not be
advised of the right to counsel until they are in custody and interroga-
tion is about to begin.93
The Canadian case of Regina v. Elshaw94 provides an illustration
of the differences between the American and Canadian laws. The case
shows how the Supreme Court of Canada may require officers to
advise suspects of their section 10(b) rights where the United States
Supreme Court might not require Miranda warnings. In Elshaw, two
adult witnesses observed Mr. Elshaw behave suspiciously with two
little boys in a public park, and they telephoned the police. When
confronted by one of the witnesses, Elshaw attempted to leave the park
by jumping a fence, but he was stopped by two police officers and
placed in the back of a police van. Five minutes later, after briefly
investigating the situation and questioning the boys and adult
witnesses, one officer returned to the van, opened the door, and asked
Elshaw what would have happened if they had not intervened.97 In
response, Elshaw made incriminating statements.9 Only then did the
police advise him of his right to counsel. 9
The Crown admitted that Elshaw had been detained and his right
to counsel abridged, but argued that under section 24(2) the confession
91. Id. at 642.
92. Regina v. Thomsen, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 640, 649 (citing Regina v. Therens, [1985] 1
S.C.R. 613, 626 (LeDain, J., dissenting)).
93. The Miranda warnings, designed to protect the Fifth Amendment privilege at the police
station, are required when the police wish to conduct a custodial interrogation. Perhaps section
10(b) can be examined more accurately in light of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The
right to counsel in Canada attaches on detention, whereas in the American system, the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel attaches when the state decides to prosecute by filing formal charges.
Some American scholars argue that the right should attach at the time of the arrest. Tomkovicz,
supra note 32, at 438.
94. [1991] 3 S.C.R. 24.
95. Id. at 31.
96. Id. at 32.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
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should be admitted.' 0 The majority of the Court disagreed that the
confession should be admitted and excluded the statement. 1'01
In the United States, the issue in Elshaw would be whether he was
subjected to a custodial interrogation. Like their counterparts in
Canada, police officers in the United States could detain Elshaw in
order to conduct a brief investigation as articulated in Terry v.
Ohio °2 and its progeny.0 3 Unlike police officers in Canada, offi-
cers in the United States would not have to warn the suspect of his
rights to counsel and to remain silent unless the court determined that
Elshaw was in custody.' Suspects, although seized for the purpose
of the Fourth Amendment, are not in custody for the purpose of
Miranda until they are formally arrested or are in a situation that
amounts to the functional equivalent of formal arrest.'05 In the
100. Id. at 34.
101. Id. at 31.
102. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
103. Descendants of Terry include: United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989) ("drug
profile" can be part of the totality of circumstances leading officers to believe criminal activity is
afoot); United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675 (1985) (duration of detention must be determined
by whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation likely to confirm or dispel their
suspicions quickly); United States v. Hensley. 469 U.S. 221 (1985) (Terry not limited to on-going
criminal activity); Michigan v. Long. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983) (the self-protection search principle
in Terry extended to searches of vehicles); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983) (trained
dog detecting narcotics is legally sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion); Adams v. Williams,
407 U.S. 143 (1972) (police officers need not observe the suspicious behavior).
In Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991), the Supreme Court of the United States held that
the appropriate test to determine whether an individual is seized within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment is whether a reasonable person, in this case a reasonable bus passenger, would be free
to decline the officer's request or otherwise terminate the encounter. Id. at 436. An objective test
was also adopted to determine whether suspects were under arrest within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment. Id.; accord Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 135-38 (1978). The
Supreme Court of Canada has adopted both an objective test and a subjective test to determine
whether suspects are under arrest. Regina v. Stonney, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 241. The objective test
is whether a "reasonable person standing in the shoes of the police officer would have believed
that reasonable and probable grounds existed to make an arrest." Id. at 250. The subjective test
examines the motives of the arresting officer. Id. Evidence that the arresting officer demonstrated
bias toward persons of different race, nationality, or color, or that there was enmity between the
officer and person arrested, "might have the effect rendering invalid an otherwise lawful arrest."
Id. at 251.
104. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 434 (1984).
105. Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977) (Miranda is not required simply
because the defendant was interrogated by a uniformed officer in the police station. Voluntarily
accompanying the police to the station house and then answering questions about the crime is not
"custody" for the purpose of Miranda.); see also California v. Behler, 463 U.S. 1121 (1983).
There may be cases where the Miranda warnings are required even though the suspect has been
neither formally arrested nor in a situation that amounts to a functional equivalent. Richard A.
Williamson, The Virtues (and Limits) of Shared Values: The Fourth Amendment and Miranda's
Concept of Custody, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 379, 385. In Regina v. Hawkins, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 157,
the Supreme Court of Canada agreed with the Newfoundland Court of Appeals that the accused
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United States, officers who make investigatory stops are not required
to read the Miranda warnings before asking suspects questions. In
Berkemer v. McCarty,"6 for example, the United States Supreme
Court held that questioning a traffic violator at the scene of the
violation was not "custody" for the purpose of administering the
Miranda warnings prior to questioning.10 7
The distinction between investigatory stops and custodial arrest
was not lost on dissenting Justice Madam L'Heureux-Dube. She did
not accept the Crown's admission that Elshaw was detained within the
meaning of section 10(b), and she urged the Court to look south and
learn from the United States Supreme Court's decisions in Terry v.
Ohio,' Adams v. Williams, 09 and Berkemer v. McCarty."' She
correctly pointed out that, in the United States, a suspicious person
stopped by the police, or a person detained in a public place for the
purpose of determining whether or not the officer's suspicions are well
grounded, is not "in custody" for the purposes of Miranda."'
Applying this rule to Canada, Justice L'Heureux-Dube concluded that
Elshaw was not detained within the meaning of section 10(b) of the
Charter; therefore, in her view, the statement was admissible."
In summary, the pre-trial right to counsel in Canada is not tied
to custodial interrogation; the issue is whether the suspect was
detained. Once the suspect is detained, a confession obtained when the
police fail to observe the requirements of section 10(b) results
automatically in suppression at trial, although the Supreme Court of
Canada has not stated this legal conclusion so boldly.
was not in detention within the meaning section 10(b) because he agreed to be questioned at the
police station rather than at his home or place of business. Id. at 158. The police telephoned the
suspect, requesting the interview and giving him the choice of location.
106. 468 U.S. 420 (1984).
107. Id. at 441-42.
108. 392 U.S. 1 (1967).
109. 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
110. 468 U.S. 420 (1984).
111. Elshaw, [1991] 3 S.C.R. at 60.
112. Id. at 70. Of course, in the United States, placing Elshaw in a police van while a short
investigation was conducted might be the functional equivalent of an arrest, in which case
Miranda would be required before interrogation. Apparently, Madam Justice L'Heureux-Dube
recognized this possibility and argued that, even if Elshaw had been detained, the statement
should not be excluded because, under the Collins criteria, its admission would not bring the
administration of justice into disrepute. Id.
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2. Waiver
The Supreme Court of the United States has stated that to waive
their Fifth Amendment right, defendants must have "a full awareness
of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences
of the decision to abandon it."... 3 Miranda serves this waiver require-
ment by informing defendants of the nature of their rights and the
consequences if they waive those rights."' The waiver requirement
in Canada is more rigorous, as illustrated by Regina v. Clarkson."'
Clarkson concerned the admissibility of a confession obtained from
an intoxicated and emotionally distraught suspect. Ms. Clarkson was
arrested for the shooting death of her husband and was told, on at least
two occasions, of her section 10(b) rights." 6  Nonetheless, she
steadfastly maintained, against the advice of a relative present during
the interrogation, that she did not need a lawyer." 7 The police
accepted her word and obtained an incriminating statement."'
Citing Von Moltke v. Gillies".9 and Adams v. United States,2'
two Sixth Amendment cases from the United States, the Supreme
113. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986).
114. Id. The Court has not clarified the consequences of which the defendant must be
made aware. Dix, supra note 32, at 246. Nevertheless. defendants need not be aware that an
attorney is attempting to contact them. Moran, 475 U.S. at 421. Nor must they be told about
the nature of the crime under investigation. Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 573-75 (1987).
115. [1986] 1 S.C.R. 383. For a comparison of the waiver requirements between the United
States and Canada, see Harvie & Foster, Ties That Bind, supra note 71, at 783-85, and Robert
Harvie & Hamar Foster, Different Drummers, Different Drums, The Supreme Court of Canada,
American Jurisprudence and the Continuing Revision of Criminal Law under the Charter, 24
OTTAWA L. REV. 39, 62-65 (1992) [hereinafter Harvie & Foster, Different Drummers, Different
Drums].
116. Clarkson, [1986] 1 S.C.R. at 383.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. 332 U.S. 708 (1948). This case involved a defendant who had purportedly waived his
Sixth Amendment right to counsel at trial and then pleaded guilty.
120. 317 U.S. 269 (1942). This case dealt with the issue of whether a layman could waive
the right to counsel at trial and the right to trial by jury. The Court rejected the position that
a layman could never waive these two rights and held the waiver valid so long as the defendant
knew what he was doing so that "his choice is made with eyes open." Id. at 279. In Johnson v.
Zenbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938), the Court stated that a waiver is valid when it reflects "an
intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." Id. at 464. Johnson
and Von Moltke dealt with courtroom waiver, a situation in which a defense attorney and a judge
are generally present to advise the accused and to ensure that the accused understands the full
impact of the waiver. In Fifth Amendment waiver cases, neither defense attorneys nor judges are
normally in police interrogation rooms. William T. Pizzi, Waiver of Rights in the Interrogation
Room: The Court's Dilemma, 23 CONN. L. REV. 229, 240 (1991).
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Court of Canada adopted an awareness of consequences test. 121
Writing for the Clarkson majority, Madam Justice Wilson quoted with
favor the waiver language from the Von Moltke decision:
To be valid such waiver must be made with an apprehension of the
nature of the charges, the statutory offense included within them,
the range of allowable punishments thereunder, possible defenses to
the charge and the circumstances in mitigation thereof, and all other
facts essential to a broad understanding of the whole matter. 122
Although Madam Justice Wilson hesitated to require defendants to be
aware of the legal intricacies of the case, she did point out that "any
voluntary waiver in order to be valid and effective must be premised
on a true appreciation of the consequences of giving up the right." '23
The Canadian Court reaffirmed this approach in Regina v.
Evans'24 by requiring that suspects have a true appreciation of the
circumstances in which they find themselves. Mr. Evans was arrested
on a marijuana charge in the hope that he would provide evidence that
his brother had committed murders. 2 During the course of the first
interview, officers began to suspect Evans of the killings. 1 6  During
the second interview, the officers falsely told Evans that his finger-
prints had been found at the scene. 127  This strategy eventually
produced a confession to the murder. 28
Although Evans was advised of his section 10(b) right to retain
and instruct counsel without delay, the Court found a number of
121. Clarkson, [1986] 1 S.C.R. at 386. Madam Justice Wilson's reliance on these two Sixth
Amendment cases is an excellent illustration of the Supreme Court of Canada's initial
misunderstanding of the difference between the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the United States
Constitution. Recently, the Court has become more sophisticated in its use of United States
Supreme Court precedent. Harvie & Foster, Different Drummers, Different Drums, supra note 115,
at 110.
122. Clarkson, [1986] 1 S.C.R. at 395 (quoting Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 724
(1948)).
123. Id. at 396. In order to waive the Miranda rights in the United States, defendants do
not have to possess full knowledge of the ramifications of their decision. They need only
understand that they have the right to remain silent and the right to counsel. Moran, 475 U.S.
at 421-23; see also DAVID M. NISSMAN & ED HAGEN, LAW OF CONFESSIONS 6-12 (2d ed.
1994). In Canada, the burden of establishing an unequivocal waiver is on the prosecution and
the standard of proof is very high. Regina v. Bartle, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 173, 174. In the United
States, the burden of establishing a waiver of the Miranda rights is on the prosecution and the
burden of proof is preponderance of the evidence. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 168-69
(1986).
124. (1991] 1 S.C.R. 869.
125. Id. at 878.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 881.
128. Id.
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problems with his waiver. First, the police made no attempt to explain
the rights after Evans indicated he did not understand them.'29
Second, and most importantly, the police read his section 10(b) rights
after Evans had been arrested for the marijuana charge but not before
they began interviewing him about the murder.13 °  The Court
reasoned that it was necessary to reiterate the section 10(b) warning if"the nature of the investigation" changes.' To do otherwise, wrote
Madam Justice McLachlin,
leaves open the possibility of police manipulation, whereby the
police-hoping to question a suspect in a serious crime without the
suspect's lawyer present-bring in the suspect on a relatively minor
offence, one for which a person may not consider it necessary to
have a lawyer immediately present, in order to question him or her
on the more serious crime. 13 2
The United States Supreme Court gave its stamp of approval to such
police tactics in Colorado v. Spring.'3 3
The Supreme Court of Canada, in Regina v. Smith,3 4 clarified
the position it had initially taken in Clarkson and Evans.3 In Smith,
the defendant had been drinking and had received a severe beating
when he was arrested.'36 At the time of the arrest, he was told that
his arrest was related to the "shooting incident" of the previous day
and was advised of his right to retain and instruct counsel immediately,
which he waived.' He was told neither that the victim was dead
nor that he was being charged with murder. 3 The Supreme Court
of Canada upheld the defendant's waiver because his knowledge of the
charge was easily inferred from the circumstances. 39 Retreating from
Clarkson, Madam Justice McLachlin noted that it had never been
suggested that
129. Id. at 879.
130. Id. Section 10(a) reads: "Everyone has the right on arrest or detention (a) to be
informed without unreasonable delay of the specific offence." CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act,
1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms), § 10(a).
131. Evans, [1991] 1 S.C.R. at 871.
132. Id. at 892.
133. 479 U.S. 564 (1987).
134. 119911 1 S.C.R. 714.
135. Some Canadian commentators argue that the waiver rule established by the Supreme
Court (prior to Smith) goes too far and is likely to be modified in fact if not in law. Should the
Police Be Advising of the Right to Counsel?, [1990] 74 CRIM. REP. (3d) 151.
136. Smith, [1991] 1 S.C.R. at 714.
137. Id. at 718-19.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 724-25.
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full information is required for a valid waiver. Indeed, if this were
the case, waivers would seldom be valid, since the police typically
do not know the whole story when the accused is arrested. Nor is
the failure of the police to precisely identify the charge faced in the
words of the Criminal Code necessarily fatal. In the initial stages of
an investigation the police themselves may not know the precise
offence with which the accused will be charged. 4
Even with this slight retreat, or clarification, Canadian waiver law
continues to be more solicitous of individual rights than American law.
Smith's waiver was valid because the Court inferred that he knew the
charge was murder. Absent such inference, the failure of the police to
inform him would have been fatal. In Canada, the issue is whether
suspects understand the true import of the questioning and the true
extent of their criminal liability.'41 This is because, in Canada, (1)
a lack of information on the part of the suspect can "taint" the section
10(b) warning,142 (2) the detainee is entitled to know "the extent of
[his or her] jeopardy,"' 43 and (3) the test for a valid waiver entails"awareness of the consequences."' 44  In the United States, the issue
is whether the defendant understands the right to remain silent and the
right to counsel.'45
140. Id. at 728. Nevertheless, Madam Justice McLachlin was aware that Canada had taken
a different approach than the United States to the issue of waiver. "In Canada," she wrote,
we have adopted a different approach [than in the United States]. We take the view
that the accused's understanding of his situation is relevant to whether he has made a
valid and informed waiver. This approach is mandated by § 10(a) of the Charter, which
gives the detainee the right to be promptly advised of the reasons for his or her
detention. It is exemplified by three related concepts: (1) the "tainting" of a warning
as to the right to counsel by lack of information, (2) the idea that one is entitled to know
the "extent of one's jeopardy," and (3) the concept of "awareness of consequences"
developed in the context of waiver.
Id. at 726-27.
141. Id. at 726-27.
142. Regina v. Greffe, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 755, 759.
143. Regina v. Black, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 138, 139.
144. Regina v. Clarkson, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 383, 385-86. However, quaere whether the Court's
recent decision in Regina v. Whittle, [1994] 116 D.L.R.4th 416, also signals a retreat. In Whittle,
the Court not only departed from Clarkson in holding that "awareness of consequences" was not
a part of the common law confession rule, but also in holding that waiver of section 10(b) required
only that a suspect possess the "limited cognitive capacity required for fitness to stand trial." Id.
at 417. Whittle was suffering from mental illness at the time he confessed. Id. The United
States Supreme Court held, in Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986), that a statement from
a mentally ill accused was not involuntary for the purpose of due process absent some form of
state coercion. Id. at 166-67 (1986). The same rule applies to the waiver requirement in
Miranda. Id. at 169-70.
145. Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 296 (1988). In Patterson, the defendant was
interrogated after his indictment was returned but before counsel was appointed. Id. at 288-89.
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3. Evidence Emanating from the Accused
In Canada, the concept of evidence emanating from the accused
goes beyond the traditional self-incrimination notion of testimonial
evidence and includes line-up identification and blood samples.'46
The Supreme Court of Canada has excluded line-up identification and
blood samples from trial when the police failed to advise suspects of
their section 10(b) right, failed to obtain a valid waiver, or did not
provide a reasonable opportunity to obtain counsel.' 47 Identification
at a line-up and blood samples are the types of evidence that do not
exist independently of the Charter violation and create an unfair trial
when admitted in evidence. 4
In Regina v. Ross, 49 three teenagers were arrested in the early
morning hours for breaking and entering."' They were advised of
their right to instruct and retain counsel, but because of the lateness of
the hour they were unable to contact their lawyers.' The police
then told them to participate in a line-up, and they did.'52 The
Supreme Court of Canada unanimously ruled that the defendants were
denied a reasonable opportunity to consult counsel, and the majority
excluded the identification made at the line-up.5 3
Justice Lamer reasoned that although there was no legal obligation
on the part of the accused to participate in the line-up, legal conse-
quences might have flowed from a refusal. 54 A lawyer can describe
to the accused the proper methods of conducting a line-up and the
He was given a Miranda warning, which he waived, but he argued that the indictment entitled
him to something more than the mere Miranda warnings. Id. at 290. The Court disagreed and
held that "[als a general matter ... an accused who is admonished with the warnings . . . in
Miranda ... has been sufficiently apprised of the nature of his Sixth Amendment right [as well]."
Id. at 296.
146. In the United States, neither line-ups nor blood samples are the types of evidence
protected by the Fifth Amendment. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 220 (1967); Schmerber
v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 760 (1966).
147. See, e.g., Regina v. Ross, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 3; Regina v. Therens, (1985] 1 S.C.R. 613.
148. Prior to the Charter, the Supreme Court of Canada held that line-up evidence was not
covered by the self-incrimination doctrine, which in Canada is restricted to trial. Regina v.
Marcoux & Soloman, [19761 1 S.C.R. 763. Similarly, in Regina v. Hogan, [1975] 2 S.C.R. 574,
another pre-Charter case, the court held that breathalyzer evidence obtained in violation of the
right to counsel was nonetheless admissible. Id. at 585.
149. [1989] 1 S.C.R. 3.
150. Id. at 3.
151. Id. at 7.
152. Id. at 8.
153. Id. at 5.
154. Id. at 14.
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legal consequences of participating or not participating. 5 ' Although
the identity of the accused certainly pre-exists a Charter violation, an
identification obtained by a line-up is not, according to the Court,
preexisting evidence." 6 The purpose of the line-up is to reinforce
the credibility of identification evidence.1"7 An accused who partici-
pates in a line-up is participating in the collection of inculpatory evi-
dence."5 8 Thus, an accused who is told to participate in a line-up
without a reasonable opportunity to communicate with counsel is
conscripted against himself to create evidence for the trial.'59
The Supreme Court of Canada, in Regina v. Therens,160 excluded
the result of a blood-alcohol test because the police failed to advise the
accused of his right to retain and instruct counsel.16' Therens was
involved in an automobile accident.'62 The investigating officer,
pursuant to what was then section 235(1) of the Canadian Criminal
Code, demanded that Therens accompany him to the police station to
provide a breath sample for a blood-alcohol test. 63 Therens com-
plied and was convicted of impaired driving on the basis of the
breathalyzer readings. 64  He was not advised that he had the right
to retain and instruct counsel without delay. 16
The majority of the Supreme Court of Canada held that Therens
was detained for purposes of section 10(b). 166 They went on to hold
that the failure to advise the defendant of his right to counsel was a
"flagrant" violation of the Charter, and that admitting the evidence
would bring the administration of justice into disrepute because the
detainee was required by law to provide evidence that was incriminat-
155. Id.
156. Id. at 16.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 17. The accused, for example, might be shown to witnesses individually without
benefit of a line-up. Pre-Charter jurisprudence permitted the Crown to place into evidence the
fact that the accused failed to participate in a line-up. See, e.g., Marcoux & Soloman, [1976] 1
S.C.R. at 775. American readers may have difficulty understanding how line-up identification
can be evidence emanating from the accused. Madam Justice L'Heureaux-Dube had the same
difficulty. Her dissent in Ross argued that the identity of the accused pre-existed the line-up as
did the perceptions of witnesses. Ross, [1989] 1 S.C.R. at 18. The identification evidence, she
reasoned, came into existence at the time the accused was seen committing the crime. Id.
160. [1985] 1 S.C.R. 613.
161. Id. at 620.
162. Id. at 613.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 620.
166. Id. at 619.
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ing-the breath sample. 6 7 In the United States, the Fifth Amend-
ment protects the accused only from being compelled to provide the
state with evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature. 16' The
right does not protect suspects from appearing in line-ups, or providing
breath or blood samples. 169  The right to counsel, therefore, is not
available at a line-up conducted before the defendant has been formally
charged or indicted, 7' or at breath tests. 171
4. Right to Government Appointed Counsel
The Miranda decision made clear that a defendant is entitled to
court appointed counsel before interrogation can begin. The explicit
language of section 10(b) does not require the police to warn detainees
of a right to provincial legal aid, but the Supreme Court of Canada has
interpreted section 10(b) to require such a warning.'72
In Regina v. Brydges,'73 the Court ruled a statement inadmissible
on the ground that the police had not advised the defendant of the
availability of legal aid after he expressed concern about not being able
to afford a lawyer.174 Brydges, a resident of Alberta, was arrested in
Manitoba and charged with second degree murder."S He was
informed of his right to retain and instruct counsel without delay, 176
and upon arrival at the police station, Brydges asked the investigator
whether the province of Manitoba had legal aid because he could not
afford a lawyer. 77  The investigator, also from Alberta, answered
that he imagined that such a system existed in the province but asked
the defendant whether there was a need for him to talk with a
167. See id. In the United States, the police need not read the Miranda warnings to an
accused prior to administering a breath test, but they must be read to the accused if the police
intend to obtain incriminating statements. Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 604-05 (1990).
168. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
169. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (blood tests); United States v. Wade, 388
U.S. 218 (1967) (line-ups).
170. The Sixth Amendment requires that the accused be advised of his or her right to
counsel before appearing in a line-up and after he or she has been formally charged or indicted.
Wade, 388 U.S. at 220-21.
171. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 690 (1972); Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 760.
172. Although the Charter does not explicitly provide for counsel at trial, all the Provinces
provide legal aid in criminal cases to those suspects who are indigent and are charged with an
offense where there is a reasonable chance they will go to jail or lose their livelihood. CURT T.
GRIFFITHS AND SIMON N. VERDUN-JONES, CANADIAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 286 (1994).
173. [1990] 1 S.C.R. 190.
174. Id. at 210.
175. Id. at 194.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 195.
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lawyer.17  Brydges answered, "Not right now, no." '179  During the
subsequent interrogation, he made a number of incriminating
statements.180
Chief Justice Lamer, writing for the majority of the Court, found
a violation of section 10(b)."'1 The Court held that the defendant's
inability to afford counsel was an impediment to his right to retain and
instruct counsel. 82 Although the investigator was from outside the
province, the Court felt that he could have easily discovered the
availability of legal aid. 83
The holding of Brydges is narrow, but the significance of the case
lies in the "bright line" drawn by Chief Justice Lamer. He held that
section 10(b) requires not only that detainees and arrestees be warned
of their right to retain and instruct counsel without delay, but that as
a matter of course, they must also be told of the availability of legal
aid. 184
In Regina v. Bartle,85 the Court drew another bright line,
holding that detainees in a province that had established a twenty-four-
hour duty counsel system must be advised, as part of the section 10(b)
warning, that duty counsel is available, and they must be told how to
avail themselves of this service.'86 In Bartle, the defendant was
arrested for impaired driving. and was cautioned at the roadside that he
had a right to retain and instruct counsel without delay and that he
could apply to the Ontario Legal Aid Plan for legal assistance.'87
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 196.
181. Id. at 210.
182. Id. at 209.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 209, 211-12. The Court distinguished between the role of duty counsel and the
role of legal aid counsel. While duty counsel provides temporary legal advice, legal aid counsel
provides arrestees with long-term legal advice regarding bail, pleas, and trial. As a result of this
rule, some provinces established a twenty-four-hour duty-counsel system to give immediate but
temporary legal advice to detainees regardless of whether they could afford counsel. Id. at 212-14.
See also Kathryn Moore, Police Implementation of Supreme Court of Canada Charter Decisions: An
Empirical Study, 30 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 547, 563-65 (1992).
185. [1994] 3 S.C.R. 173.
186. Id. at 176. Bartle was one of a group of five contemporaneously adjudicated decisions
dealing with the issue of access to duty counsel. The other four decisions were Regina v.
Matheson, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 328; Regina v. Prosper, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 236; Regina v. Pozniak,
[1994] 3 S.C.R. 310; and Regina v. Harper, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 343. Harper and Pozniak reaffirmed
that suspects must be told about duty counsel and how to access the service, but they differed on
whether the Crown had met its burden that the accused in these cases would have acted
differently if they had known about duty counsel and how to access legal assistance.
187. Bartle. [1994] 3 S.C.R. at 176.
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The officer then read the breathalyzer demand, and the accused made
a number of incriminating statements.' At the police station, the
officer told the suspect that he could telephone a lawyer.8 9 The
accused refused and took the breathalyzer test.190 At no time was the
suspect told that the province had established a twenty-four-hour duty
counsel accessible through a toll-free telephone number.' 9 ' Chief
Justice Lamer, writing for the majority, held that the failure of the
officer to inform the suspect at the roadside detention of the availabili-
ty of duty counsel and the toll-free telephone number violated section
10(b). 192 The fact that no telephone was immediately available was
of little concern to the Court. Chief Justice Lamer suggested that the
police should explain to detainees that, as soon as they reach the police
station, they may telephone duty counsel. 9' The Court excluded the
incriminating statements as well as the results from the breathalyzer
test under section 24(2).194
Some provinces have elected not to establish twenty-four-hour
duty counsel systems. This election was held not to violate the
Charter in Regina v. Matheson,'95 where the Supreme Court of
Canada concluded that section 10(b) does not require provinces to
provide duty counsel to render immediate legal advice to detainees.1'9
Moreover, in those provinces that have not established a system to
provide temporary legal advice, the police are under no obligation to
inform a detainee about duty counsel.'97 So long as the detainee is
read the section 10(b) warning, accompanied by the Brydges require-
188. Id. Section 254(3) of the Criminal Code allows police officers in Canada to demand
that a driver of a vehicle take a breathalyzer test when they have reasonable and probable cause
to believe the individual is driving under the influence of alcohol. Section 254(5) of the Code
makes it a criminal offense to refuse to take a breathalyzer test. Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46,
§§ 254(3) & (5) (1985).
189. Bartle, [1994] 3 S.C.R. at 174.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. Madam Justice L'Heureux-Dube argued in dissent that the holding in Bartle was
a "clear invitation to provinces to refrain from going beyond what is strictly constitutionally
required on the one hand, and on the other, to discontinue practices which exceed constitutional
minimum standards." Id. at 224.
193. Id. at 186.
194. Id.
195. [1994] 3 S.C.R. 328.
196. Id. at 335.
197. Id. In Matheson, the accused was advised of his right to consult and instruct counsel,
including his right to apply for legal aid. The province of Prince Edward Island had not
established a twenty-four-hour duty-counsel system and the suspect was not advised about duty
counsel. The suspect, however, waived his section 10(b) rights and made no demand to consult
counsel. Id. at 329.
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ment about the right to apply for legal aid, the informational compo-
nent of section 10(b) has been met. 9 '
Nevertheless, those provinces that have not established a twenty-
four-hour duty counsel system often pay a heavy penalty. In Regina
v. Prosper,199 a Nova Scotia detainee demanded to consult and
instruct counsel.2"' No such system existed in the province at the
time.20' The accused was stopped by a police officer early Saturday
afternoon in Halifax and charged with impaired driving.2"2 The
officer advised the accused of his section 10(b) rights, including the
right to apply for legal aid.2" 3 The officer demanded that the suspect
take a breathalyzer test. 2 4 The suspect indicated that he would take
the test but first wanted to talk with a lawyer.20 ' At the police
station, the suspect was provided with a list of Legal Aid attorneys and
their home telephone numbers.20 6 The accused made fifteen tele-
phone calls but was unable to contact a lawyer.20 7 Unknown to the
officer, the Legal Aid lawyers in Halifax had advised the provincial
Attorney General a few days earlier that they would take no more
telephone calls outside of regular working hours, thus ending the
twenty-four-hour duty counsel system in the area.20 ' Unable to
contact duty counsel and unable to afford a private lawyer, the accused
took the breath test. 09
Chief Justice Lamer reasoned that the implementation of section
10(b) requires that once the detainee has indicated a desire to talk with
counsel, the state must provide the detainee with a reasonable
opportunity to do so. 210 According to the Chief Justice, "'reasonable
198. Id. at 336.
199. [1994] 3 S.C.R. 236.
200. Id. at 236-37.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 237.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 238.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 245. Chief Justice Lamer re-emphasized that section 10(b) does not impose a
constitutional duty on provinces to ensure that Brydges duty counsel is available to detainees. Id.
In a not-too-subtle effort to persuade reluctant provinces to establish twenty-four-hour duty
counsels, he took pains to describe the various duty counsel schemes throughout Canada and
suggested such systems are not costly to establish and maintain. Id. Madam Justice L'Heureux-
Dube agreed that section 10(b) did not require provinces to provide twenty-four-hour duty
counsel, but argued that the suspect in Prosper was provided ample opportunity to consult and
instruct counsel. Id. at 280.
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opportunity' will depend on all the surrounding circumstances. These
circumstances include the availability of duty counsel services in the
jurisdiction where the detention takes place."..' The lack of duty
counsel services extends the time in which the detainee will have the
ability to exercise his right to counsel.212 As a result, officers must
"hold-off" from attempting to elicit incriminating evidence from the
detainee until he or she has had a reasonable opportunity to contact
counsel.2 3  The hold-off period may require officers to wait until
Legal Aid lawyers are available during regular office hours, or until the
accused is taken before a magistrate.2 14  Because the police in Prosper
failed to hold-off until the suspect could consult counsel, the results of
the breath test were inadmissible under Section 24(2).215
In sum, whether the police can obtain self-incriminating evidence
quickly depends, in part, on the existence or nonexistence of twenty-
four-hour duty counsel. Police in those provinces without twenty-four-
hour duty counsel risk the loss or inadmissibility of self-incriminating
evidence if it is obtained when duty counsel is not available.216
At first impression, Brydges and its progeny seem to correspond
to the Miranda warning about court appointed counsel. However,
211. Id. at 269. Detainees must be reasonably diligent in pursuing their right to counsel.
The existence or nonexistence of twenty-four-hour duty counsel may impact what constitutes
reasonable diligence. Detainees may not have to be as diligent in seeking advice during times
when the duty counsel does not exist, as opposed to times when duty counsel is available. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 270.
215. Id. at 274.
216. The Chief Justice recognized this possibility and suggested that the potential loss of
evidence can be taken into account in determining reasonable opportunity. In Prosper, the Court
dismissed the issue of whether the long delay meant the loss of the breathalyzer evidence because
it did not arise on the facts of the case. Id. Furthermore, the Court suggested that there may be
cases in which urgent circumstances require that the police obtain the evidence immediately. The
Court had previously indicated such a possibility in Elshaw, [1991] 3 S.C.R. at 30. The Chief
Justice suggested, however, that whether breath samples can be used as evidence in impaired
driving cases under the urgent circumstance doctrine may require an examination of the
constitutionality of section 254(5) of the Criminal Code. Prosper, [1994] 3 S.C.R. at 274. This
section makes it a criminal offense to refuse to provide a breath sample. Moreover, Chief Justice
Lamer was unwilling to find that the two-hour evidentiary presumption available to the Crown
in impaired driving cases was sufficient itself to be an urgent circumstance. Id. Section 258(1)
of the Code allows the Crown a presumption that the breathalyzer reading taken within two hours
after the incident was the concentration of alcohol in the blood at the time of the alleged offense.
Id. at 281.
Madam Justice L'Heureux-Dube argued in dissent that the hold-off penalizes provinces
without twenty-four-hour duty counsels and warned that the requirement may signal the end of
the breathalyzer as a means of testing blood-alcohol levels of impaired drivers in those provinces.
Id. This result, she suggested, is an aberration in light of the holding that twenty-four-hour duty
counsels are not constitutionally mandated. Id.
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deeper analysis suggests that this is not the case. The Miranda Court
required a warning about appointed counsel at the police station, in
part, because "[d]enial of counsel to the indigent at the time of
interrogation while allowing an attorney to those who can afford one
would be no more supportable ... than the similar situation at
trial."2 '7 The Canadian Charter, unlike the United States Constitu-
tion, does not contain an explicit right to counsel at trial, and the
Supreme Court of Canada has been adamant in its refusal to read
formally into section 10(b) a requirement for twenty-four-hour duty
counsel.2 18  These rights, if they exist, are presently statutory rights
only, limited by the legal aid laws of each province. Nevertheless, the
practical implication of the decisions in Brydges, Bartle, and Prosper is
that provinces must provide twenty-four-hour duty counsel accessible
to detainees and advise detainees of its availability, or risk the loss at
trial of self-incriminating evidence under section 24(2). Finally, it
seems likely that the thinking behind these decisions will stimulate
pressure to read the right to legal aid at trial into section 7 of the
Charter.2 9
5. Search and Seizure and the Right to Counsel
The Supreme Court of Canada, in its initial Charter decisions,
suggested that failure of the police to advise suspects of their right to
retain and instruct counsel without delay could make an otherwise
reasonable search unreasonable. In Regina v. Simmons,22 customs
officers stopped Ms. Simmons at the border and conducted a strip
search. 221  They did not read Ms. Simmons her section 10(b) rights
217. 384 U.S. 436, 472-73 (1966).
218. Section 10(b) is not sufficiently explicit about whether defendants are entitled to
counsel at trial. CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms), § 10(b).
219. In Brydges, Chief Justice Lamer declined to decide whether section 7 of the Charter
required state-funded counsel in criminal cases for people without financial means. [19901 1
S.C.R. at 217. However, in Regina v. Rowbotham, [1988] 25 O.A.C. 321, the Ontario Court of
Appeal held that, in cases not covered by provincial legal aid plans, the combined effect of
sections 7 and 11 (d) of the Charter is that funded counsel must be provided if a defendant wants
a lawyer, cannot pay for one, and cannot have a fair trial without one. Id. at 325.
Section 11 (d) of the Charter states that "[a]ny person charged with an offence has the right
to be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law in a fair and public hearing by an
independent and impartial tribunal." CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms), § 11(d).
In Prosper, Madam Justice L'Heureux-Dube hinted in her dissent that there may be a
minimum level of legal aid imposed by section 7. [1994] 3 S.C.R. at 288.
220. [1988] 2 S.C.R. 495.
221. Id. at 496. The Simmons decision hinged on sections 143 and 144 of the Customs Act,
R.S.C. ch. C-40 (1970). This act authorized a customs officer to search any person if the officer
1996]
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or point out that, under the Customs Act, persons may ask to be taken
before a magistrate, justice of the peace, or chief officer at the port of
entry before being searched.222 The majority of the Supreme Court
ruled that persons subjected to a search at the border are detained
pursuant to section 10(b) and must be told of their right to retain and
instruct counsel.223 On the facts in Simmons, the Court reasoned that
the presence of counsel could have helped the detainee to understand
the options available to her under the statutes, and the officers' failure
to warn her of that right made their search unreasonable.224
The Court retreated from this doctrine in Regina v. Debot.225
The defendant in Debot was detained and subjected to a warrantless
frisk before he was advised of his right to retain and instruct coun-
sel.226 In that case, the majority of the Court took issue with the
argument that the failure to advise the defendant of his section 10(b)
right affects the reasonableness of the search.2 27  Nevertheless, the
majority reasoned that the failure to read section 10(b) would affect the
reasonableness of the search in two exceptional circumstances.228
The first exists when the police seek to obtain consent of the person
detained to conduct the search.22 ' The second exists in those rare
cases like Simmons where the section 10(b) violation goes to the very
lawfulness of the search. 23°  Even by narrowing the situations in
which the failure to advise a detainee of his right to counsel affects the
reasonableness of the search, the Supreme Court of Canada goes
beyond the United States Supreme Court in protecting the rights of the
accused.
In situations where the accused knows that the interrogator is a
police officer or a person in authority, the Supreme Court of Canada
had reasonable cause to believe that the person had goods subject to entry at customs or
prohibited goods secreted about his or her person.
222. Simmons, [1988] 2 S.C.R. at 498. These rights were posted on the wall but there was
no evidence that Ms. Simmons read them. Id. at 507.
223. Id. at 521.
224. Id. at 522.
225. [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1140.
226. Id. at 1152. The Court came to the rather odd conclusion that Debot was entitled to
be told about the right to counsel but not to exercise it. Id. at 1165, 1175.
227. Id. at 1172-75.
228. Id. at 1173.
229. Id. at 1173-74. In the United States, the Fourth Amendment does not require the
prosecution to demonstrate that suspects knew of their right to refuse in order to prove voluntary
consent to the search. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 249 (1973).
230. Simmons, [1988] 2 S.C.R. at 498. Whether the real evidence will be admitted under
section 24(2) will depend on whether the independently existing real evidence could or would have
been found without the compelled testimony. Regina v. Thomson, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 640, 650.
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is more willing to find that the constable blundered than is the United
States Supreme Court. The Court's broad definition of detention, its
stringent waiver requirement, its extension of the concept of testimonial
evidence to evidence emanating from the accused, its holding that the
police must hold-off interrogations until duty counsel is available for
the accused even in light of no constitutional requirement for provinces
to provide duty counsel, and the limited right to counsel during
searches has led the Supreme Court of Canada to declare confessions
unconstitutional and exclude the confession from trial in situations in
which the United States Supreme Court would not.
B. Questioning of Suspects by Undercover Agents or Persons Not
Known by Suspects to be Persons in Authority
Questioning of suspects may occur surreptitiously by police
officers or agents of the police while suspects are in jail or still free.
This section explores decisions from the Supreme Court of Canada
focusing on surreptitious interrogations and compares them to similar
decisions from the United States Supreme Court.
1. Questioning by Undercover Agents of Detainees
Section 10(b) does not apply to surreptitious questioning of a
suspect when the suspect is unaware that the questioner is an officer.
The Supreme Court of Canada has, however, applied the right to
silence found in section 7 in such a situation. For example, where the
suspect was detained, consulted an attorney, and then was engaged in
conversation by an undercover agent of the police, the Court has held
that the right of silence applies. In Regina v. Hebert,23 the defendant
was a robbery suspect who was informed of his right to retain and
instruct counsel 2  Hebert did consult with a lawyer 3  He was
then placed in a cell with an undercover police agent who engaged him
in conversation.2 4  During the course of the conversation, Hebert
made incriminating statements about the robbery.235  Although
Hebert had been administered the section 1 0(b) warning and consulted
counsel, the Court declined to base its decisions on a right to counsel
231. [199012 S.C.R. 151.
232. Id. at 153.
233. Id. According to the agreed statement of facts, Hebert was arrested for a narcotic
offense but was the prime suspect in a robbery. Preliminary Inquiry in Regina v. Hebert-How
Did the Officer Engage the Conversation?. [1991] 3 CRIM. REP. (4th) 61.
234. Hebert, [1990] 2 S.C.R. at 153.
235. Id.
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analysis.236 The majority recognized the close relationship between
the right to counsel and the right to silence, but chose to analyze the
case in terms of section 7 of the Charter, where they found a right to
silence that attached upon detention.23  The majority of the Court
neither required the police to inform suspects of their right to silence
nor required the police to obtain a waiver.23  Nevertheless, the Court
held that if the conduct of the police effectively deprives detainees of
their right to refuse to speak to the authorities, section 7 is violat-
ed.2 39  Employing this approach, the Court held that the trick used
by the police had the effect of denying Hebert his freedom of choice
and, consequently, the Court excluded his confession. 40
The Court in Hebert set out four explicit limitations on the right
to silence. First, uniformed officers or those known by the defendant
to be in authority may question an accused in the absence of counsel
once counsel has been retained. 4  Second, the right to silence
attaches only after detention.242 Third, the right to silence is not
236. Id.
237. Id. at 164.
238. Id. Two concurring Justices, Wilson and Sopinka, would have incorporated a waiver
into the right to silence doctrine. Id. at 180. Madam Justice Wilson suggested that a right to
silence may exist prior to detention. Id. at 185.
239. Id. at 166. The Crown and the defense agreed that section 7 contained a right to
silence but disagreed that it applied in this fact situation. Id. at 154.
240. Id. at 164. The pre-Charter case of Regina v. Rothman, [19811 1 S.C.C. 640,
permitted police to use undercover agents to elicit confessions from suspects who had invoked
their right to counsel. Id. at 664. The Court reasoned that the statement was voluntary because
Rothman did not know he was speaking to a person in authority. Id. In so far as Rothman
permitted the use of undercover agents to elicit confessions from jailed suspects who had invoked
their right to counsel, it was overruled by Hebert. Hebert, [1990] 2 S.C.R. at 173.
241. Hebert, [1990] 2 S.C.R. at 164. The rule in the United States is different. In Edwards
v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), the United States Supreme Court held that once the defendant
clearly expresses his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, the defendant cannot be
further interrogated until counsel has been made available or until the suspect initiates the
conversation. Id. at 484-85. In Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 (1990), the Court extended
the Edwards doctrine to situations where defendants had consulted counsel. Id. at 153. The
Edwards doctrine also applies when the police want to interrogate about a subject matter unrelated
to earlier questioning. Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 683 (1985). The Sixth Amendment
is offense specific and, as a result, the commencement of the Sixth Amendment in one offense
does not trigger the Edwards rule relative to a separate offense. McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S.
171, 178 (1991).
242. Hebert, [1990] 2 S.C.R. at 164. In the United States, if a defendant demands the right
to silence without demanding counsel, the Supreme Court has permitted the police to reinterrogate
so long as Miranda is scrupulously followed. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104 (1975). The
Sixth Amendment prohibits the use of undercover police agents to elicit incriminating statements
once adversary proceedings have commenced whether or not the individual is in custody. In
Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964), the defendant was not in custody. Id. at 201.
In United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264 (1980), the defendant was in custody and an undercover
cellmate was told by the F.B.I. not to engage Henry in conversation about the crime for which
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implicated in voluntary statements made to cellmates that are not
police agents. 43 Finally, the right to silence is violated when the
state's agent actively elicits the confession and not when he or she
passively listens to the incriminating statement. 244
In summary, the Hebert decision makes clear that the active
solicitation of an incriminating statement from a suspect by the state's
undercover agent, after the suspect has been detained, undermines the
right to silence in section 7. The right is not affected by interrogation
conducted by uniformed police or a person known to be in authority
after the defendant has consulted with counsel, so long as the
interrogation does not amount to a denial of the suspect's right to
choose. Moreover, the Court was explicit in its holding that the police
are under no obligation to warn a defendant of his right to silence.
The Court assumed that a defendant's lawyer will advise him of the
right.
Shortly after Hebert was announced, the Supreme Court of Canada
had the opportunity to address two issues the case left unresolved: (1)
the definition of a state agent, and (2) what it means to "elicit" a
statement. In Regina v. Broyles,245 the defendant was arrested for
forgery and was also a suspect in his grandmother's death.246  After
receiving his section 10(b) warning, he consulted with counsel, who
told him not to talk to the police.247 The police arranged for a friend
of Broyles to visit him in jail. They provided the friend with a body-
pack recording device, but did not explicitly tell the friend to elicit a
statement from Broyles.24" During the conversation, the friend
successfully encouraged Broyles to ignore the advice of his counsel that
he remain silent. The friend then asked Broyles questions about his
grandmother's death.249 Broyles made several incriminating statements.2 °
he was charged. Id. at 266. The Court found that the agent had engaged Henry in some
conversation and that the statements were a product of those conversations. Id. at 272-74.
243. Hebert, [1990] 2 S.C.R. at 166. This rule is also found in the United States. The
Fifth Amendment prohibition against compelled incrimination applies only to state action.
Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 166 (1986). Confessions obtained by private individuals not
connected to state action are not governed by the Fifth Amendment prohibition and, thus, are not
excluded from evidence. Id.
244. Hebert, [1990] 2 S.C.R. at 165. The rule is similar in the United States. Kuhlmann
v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 459 (1986) (right violated when police and their informant took some
action beyond merely listening that was deliberately designed to elicit incriminating remarks).
245. [19911 3 S.C.R. 595.
246. Id. at 600.
247. Id. at 601.
248. Id. at 602.
249. Id.
250. Id. The Court did not deal with the issue of whether the officer should have reread
section 10(b) after the focus of the interrogation changed.
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The Court asked the following question to determine whether or
not an informer was a state agent: Would the exchange between the
accused and the informer have taken place in the form and manner in
which it did but for the intervention of the state or its agents? If the
answer to this question is negative, it is then necessary to explore
whether the incriminating statements were elicited by the agent."'
The Court developed two sets of factors to determine whether
there was a connection between the conduct of the state agent and the
defendant's statements. The first set concerns the nature of the
exchange between the defendant and the state agent.25 2 If the state
agent interrogates the suspect or engages in conversation that is the
"functional equivalent" of an interrogation, then he or she is deemed
to have elicited the statement.5 3
The second set of factors focuses on the relationship between the
defendant and the state agent. 24  Did the state agent, for example,
exploit any special relationship to extract the statement?25 Applying
the state agent test and the two sets of factors to the case, the Court
found that the defendant's friend was an agent of the state and had
elicited the statement in violation of Broyles' right to silence. 26  The
confession was therefore excluded from trial. 25 7
251. Id. at 606. The test in the United States is whether, in light of all the circumstances,
the private party acted as an agent of the state. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 487
(1971). Circumstances may include the state's knowledge of or acquiescence in the activity of the
private party and the intent of the party performing the activity. United States v. Walther, 652
F.2d 788, 790 (9th Cir. 1981).
252. Broyles, [1991) 3 S.C.R. at 607-08.
253. Id. at 608. There was a conversation about the crime between the friend and Broyles
and, therefore, the court did not define functional equivalent. Id. at 608-09. In Rhode Island v.
Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980), the United States Supreme Court established a test to determine
whether police words or actions are the functional equivalent of an interrogation. The test is
whether the police officers should have known that their words or actions were reasonably likely
to elicit an incriminating response. Id. at 301. In Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582 (1990),
the Court held admissible at trial incriminating statements made in response to the officers'
carefully worded instructions on how to take the sobriety test. Id. at 603. The Court reasoned
that the description of the test was not likely to be perceived as requiring a response by the
suspect. Id. at 603-04.
254. Broyles, [1991] 3 S.C.R. at 611.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 614-15.
257. Id. at 616. Justice lacobucci, writing for the Court, suggested that instructing
informers not to elicit information will not preclude inquiry into whether this instruction was
scrupulously followed. Id. at 616-17. In Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, instructions to an
undercover agent by the police not to question a defendant regarding the crime charged is
irrelevant, even if the informer followed the instructions and did not intentionally seek information
about the crime charged. Mainre v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 173-74 (1985). The reason for this
is that accepting the incriminating statement invites the risk of fabricated investigations, and
police officers' motives are difficult to determine when the police have more than one reason to
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The judgments in Hebert and Broyles were criticized in Canada
due to their stark contrast with the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Illinois v. Perkins.258 Decided three weeks before Hebert,
the Perkins Court held that the police are not obligated to read
Miranda warnings to a defendant who is incarcerated with an
undercover agent whose purpose is to engage the defendant in an
incriminating conversation. 25 9  Justice Kennedy, writing for the
majority, argued that a jail setting is not a police-dominated atmo-
sphere and does not present the sort of compulsion that the Miranda
warnings were designed to guard against.2 60  Equating the facts in
Perkins with using undercover agents to eavesdrop on suspects who are
not in custody, he concluded that what Miranda forbids is coercion,"not mere strategic deception by taking advantage of a suspect's
misplaced trust in one he supposes to be a fellow prisoner. ' 261
Justice Kennedy's remarks, coupled with the similarity in the facts of
Perkins and Hebert, led some Canadian commentators to compare the
reasoning of the two decisions and conclude that the Perkins approach
is more sensible than that used in Hebert.262
These Canadian commentators failed to recognize what may be a
significant factual difference in the two cases. In Hebert, the suspect
had not waived his right to counsel and had consulted with counsel
prior to being placed in the jail cell. In Perkins, there was no evidence
that the defendant had previously invoked his right to counsel or his
right to silence. If Perkins had invoked his Fifth Amendment
privilege, he might well have had to initiate the conversation before
questioning would be permissible. As Justice Brennan pointed out in
a footnote to his concurring opinion, "[n]othing in the court's opinion
suggests that, had respondent previously invoked his Fifth Amendment
investigate an individual charged with a crime. Id. at 179-80.
258. 496 U.S. 292 (1990).
259. Id. at 300.
260. Id. at 296-97.
261. Id. at 297.
262. See Michael Brown & Patrick Healy, Hebert: A Constitutional Right to Silence - Two
Comments, [1990] 77 CRIM. REP. (3d) 194; Nick Lang, Tales from Two Cells - Regina v. Hebert,
(1990) 4 KEEPING TABS: CRIMINAL JUSTICE BRANCH NEWSLETTER (B.C.) 3. Canadian
Supreme Court Justice lacobucci also expressed the opinion that in Perkins, the United States
Supreme Court ruled that "Fifth Amendment rights do not prohibit surreptitious jailhouse
conversations of the kind which this court found to violate § 7 in Hebert." Broyles, [1991] 3
S.C.R. at 610.
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right to counsel or right of silence [as Hebert did], his statements
would be admissible. 263
Nevertheless, the reasoning of the majority in Perkins suggests
that Perkins trusted the undercover agent at his peril and it was
irrelevant whether he had previously invoked his Fifth Amendment
right to counsel. To the extent that this is a correct interpretation of
Perkins, the Canadian Court has gone beyond the Supreme Court of
the United States in protecting the rights of suspects in situations
where the police obtain confessions through undercover agents.
2. Questioning by Undercover Agents of Suspects Who are
Neither Detained Nor in Custody
In Regina v. Duarte264 and Regina v. Wiggins,265 the Supreme
Court of Canada permitted incriminating statements at trial when the
confessions were obtained in violation of section 8 of the Charter.
Section 8 protects privacy by ensuring that individuals are free from
unreasonable searches and seizures.266 In both cases, police officers
surreptitiously recorded the suspects' conversations, relying on a statute
permitting the interception of private communication without judicial
authorization when the interception was made with the consent of the
originator or intended recipient. 267 Neither Duarte nor Wiggins were
in custody or detained when the conversations were recorded, so
section 10(b) did not apply. The United States Supreme Court took
a different position in United States v. White. 68 In White, the Court
reasoned that the Fourth Amendment does not protect a wrongdoer's
misplaced trust in an accomplice or a police agent.269 Wrongdoers
take the risk that anyone in whom they confide may report the
conversation to the police.27° It is mere speculation, the Court
reasoned, to suggest that wrongdoers who suspect that their confidant
was reporting to the police would change the nature of their utterances
because they also suspected that the accomplice was recording the
263. Perkins, 496 U.S. at 300 n.* (Brennan, J., concurring).
264. [1990] 1 S.C.R. 30.
265. [1990] 1 S.C.R. 62.
266. Section 8 states: "Everyone has the right to be secure against unreasonable search or
seizure." CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms), § 8.
267. Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 178(11)(1) (1995). In Duarte, the monitoring took
place in a hotel room, [1990] 1 S.C.R. at 31, and in Wiggins, the officer wore a "body pack."
[1990] 1 S.C.R. at 65.
268. 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
269. Id. at 752.
270. Id.
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conversation. 271  The Supreme Court of Canada explicitly rejected
this risk analysis and held that the statute permitting the police to
monitor conversations without prior judicial authorization violated
section 8.272 Nevertheless, the Court permitted the use of the taped
conversations at trial on the ground that the officers acted in good
faith, thinking the statutes were valid.273
The Justices did not characterize the conversations as emanating
from the accused, but it is the type of evidence that has been automati-
cally excluded when obtained in violation of sections 10(b) or 7.274
Admitting the statements in Duarte and Wiggins, however, is consistent
with the Court's fair trial policy. Because neither Duarte nor Wiggins
was detained, they were not entitled to retain and instruct counsel, and
they had no right to silence. Therefore, the values underlying sections
10(b) and 7-fairness of the trial and protection of the adversary
system-were not harmed.275
271. Id.
272. Duarte, [1990] S.C.R. at 49-54. The Crown attempted to save the statute under
section 1 of the Charter. Section 1 provides that "[tihe Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed
by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society." CAN. CONST.
(Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms), § 1. The limit is
prescribed by law within the meaning of section 1 if it is expressly provided for by statute or
regulation, or results by necessary implication from the terms of a statute or regulation or from
its operating requirements. Regina v. Therens, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 613, 621; see also Regina v.
Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, 104. The Court has invoked section 1 to save laws that otherwise
violated the Charter. See, e.g., Regina v. Skinner, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1235 (prostitution); Regina v.
Keegstra, [1990) 3 S.C.R. 697 (hate laws); Regina v. Hufsky, [1988) 1 S.C.R. 621 (random traffic
stop laws). In Regina v. Thomsen, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 640, the Court found a reasonable limit on
the right to retain and instruct counsel without delay. A police officer made a formal demand on
Thomsen to provide a breath sample for a roadside screening device. Id. at 641. The officer held
Thomsen about fifteen minutes and at no time informed him of his right to retain and instruct
counsel. Id. Thomsen was charged under section 234.1 (now section 238) of the Criminal Code,
which makes it a criminal offense to refuse a demand by a peace officer to provide a sample of
breath suitable for a roadside screening device. Id. The Court reasoned that because Thomsen
was detained for the purposes of section 10(b), the statute's failure to provide for the right to
counsel contravened the Charter. Id. at 648. The Court saved the statute under section 1,
reasoning that roadside testing increased the likelihood of detecting impaired drivers and increased
the perceived risk of detection that is essential to effective deterrence. Id.
273. Duarte, [1990] S.C.R. at 56-57. For a comparison of the good faith doctrines in
Canada and the United States, see Harvie, supra note 58, at 791. For an analysis of the good faith
doctrine in Canada, see Marilyn T. MacCrimmon, Developments in the Law of Evidence: The
1986-87 Term, 10 SUP. CT. L. REV. 225, 251-59 (1988); see also Paciocco, Judicial Repeal, supra
note 21, at 333; P. Michael Bolton & Chris Tollefson, The Exclusion of Real Evidence Under
§§ 24(2) of the Charter, 48 ADVOC. 343, 350-51 (1990).
274. Paciocco, Judicial Repeal, supra note 21, at 361; see also Harvie & Foster, Different
Drummers, Different Drums, supra note 115, at 55.
275. Privacy is the underlying value protected by section 8. A violation of an individual's
privacy will rarely affect the fairness of the trial because the Canadian Court has developed a
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IV. CONCLUSION
In Canada, although the courts continue formally to confine the
self-incrimination principle to trial, it is now clear that the purpose of
the warnings prescribed in section 10(b) and the right to silence in
section 7 of the Charter is to protect a defendant's right against self-
incrimination. The failure of the police to advise suspects of their
right to retain and instruct counsel without delay or their failure to
respect suspects' right to silence "generates an identical sort of
evidence: self-incriminatory statements that would not have been made
but for the violation. "276 Protecting the right against self-incrimina-
tion, in turn, fosters "the principles of adjudicative fairness. 2 77
This fairness policy is similar to the fair trial policy found by the
Court in section 24(2).271 It is unfair to permit the use of the
statement because "the accused is placed in the invidious position of
having to take the stand, contrary to the privilege against self-
incrimination, in order to disclaim the confession. '279  The coupling
of the policies underlying sections 10(b) and 7 with section 24(2)
ensures that confessions obtained in violation of the right to counsel
and the right to silence are automatically excluded from trial. The
impact of the fair trial policy is further highlighted by the willingness
of the Court to allow into evidence confessions or statements obtained
in violation of section 8. The underlying privacy value protected by
hierarchy of privacy interests. In Hunter v. Southam, [1984) 2 S.C.R. 145, the Court suggested
that where the interest involved was the protection of bodily integrity, the standard governing the
search may be higher than reasonable grounds. Id. at 168. In a later decision, the Court
suggested that "a violation of the sanctity of a person's body is much more serious than that of
his office or even his home." Regina v. Pohoretsky, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 945, 949. In Regina v.
Dyment, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 417, a physician held a vial under Mr. Dyment's free-flowing wound
in order to collect a blood sample for medical purposes. Id. at 417-18. The police neither
requested a sample nor knew one had been taken. Id. at 418. When the doctor spoke to the
investigating officer, he handed over the sample. Id. Nevertheless, the Court held that the police
officers had violated section 8 when they obtained the sample and that admitting the evidence at
trial would bring the administration of justice into disrepute because the seizure of the blood
sample violated the personal autonomy of Mr. Dyment. Id. at 422. In Regina v. Dersch, [1993]
3 S.C.R. 768, the Court held that a blood sample taken by a physician without the accused's
consent and without knowledge of the police, but later obtained by the police without a search
warrant, violated section 8. Id. at 778. The Court excluded the evidence from trial because of
the seriousness of the police violation and the importance of guarding against a free exchange of
information between health care professionals and police. Id. at 779. These cases suggest that
the protection of bodily integrity rests at the pinnacle of the hierarchy of privacy interests.
276. Regina v. Hebert, [19901 2 S.C.R. 151, 207.
277. Regina v. Clarkson, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 383, 394.
278. See supra text accompanying notes 70-72.
279. Hebert, [1990] 2 S.C.R. at 207.
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section 8 neither impugns the privilege against self-incrimination nor
impacts upon the fairness of the trial.2"'
Prior to 1982, the Supreme Court of Canada eschewed any
relationship between the doctrine of self-incrimination and pre-trial
confessions and excluded only those confessions that were obtained
involuntarily.28 1 The enactment of the Charter, together with a few
years of jurisprudence, has altered the relative positions of the Supreme
Court of Canada and the United States Supreme Court on issues
surrounding confessions. While the American Court has continued its
uneven assault on the Miranda doctrine, the Supreme Court of Canada
has embarked on a different course in its interpretation of sections
10(b) and 7. The Canadian Court has steadfastly maintained that the
purpose of sections 10(b) and 7 is to ensure that defendants are treated
fairly. To this end, it has defined the term "detention" in section 10
broadly, has not grafted exceptions onto sections 10(b) and 7 once the
right to counsel and silence have attached,282 and has not loosened
the waiver requirements of section 10(b) substantially.283 The result
of the Court's rigid adherence to the requirements and purposes of
sections 10(b) and 7 and their close relationship to the policies
underlying section 24(2), is that when constables blunder in obtaining
confessions, the Supreme Court of Canada is likely to exclude those
confessions from trial in situations where the United States Supreme
Court would not.
280. There may, of course, be situations where the behavior of the police in violating section
8 was so outrageous that the confession or statement will be excluded.
281. There area few pre-Charter references to a connection between the confession rule and
the privilege against self-incrimination. See, e.g., Regina v. Wray, [1971] 1 S.C.R. 272, 279
(Spence, J. & Cartwright, C.J.); Piche v. The Queen, [19711 S.C.R. 23, 36 (Cartwright, C.J.);
DeClercq v. The Queen, [1968] S.C.R. 902, 905-06 (Hall & Pigeon, J.J.). But as Ratushny
points out, these references are mostly in dissenting judgments and are "tenuous in nature."
RATUSHNY, supra note 7, at 62.
282. In New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984), the Supreme Court of the United States
adopted a public safety exception to the Miranda doctrine. Id. at 652. The Supreme Court of
Canada has hinted that urgency or necessity in questioning a detainee may be used to admit the
confession under section 24(2) even though the statement was obtained in violation of section
10(b). Regina v. Elshaw, [19911 3 S.C.R. 24, 41; Regina v. Clarkson, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 383, 390.
And, of course, defendants must be "duly diligent" in acting upon their rights. Regina v. Smith,
[1991] 1 S.C.R. 714, 723.
283. Contra Regina v. Whittle, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 914, 942 (adding additional awareness of
consequences test).
1996]
